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A natural thing to do is to program  these presentations some time in advance, not being 
fully aware of the conditions we will be f acing when the tim e comes. Needless to say, 
over the past few days I have had to edit m any developments into my lecture, as the  
world economy is making history. 
 
Thinking of the global econom y’s present situation leads us to focus almost exclusively 
on the financial crisis, but this is one  aspect of m ore generalized problem s and 
imbalances that have build up over the y ears. The global econom y is going through a  
severe financial crisis, high inflation and  unusual dispersion of growth around the world. 
Furthermore, this  scen ario is ve ry uncer tain, as we have st ated in  ou r la st  Monetary 
Policy Report. 
  
Today I would like to address  the current situation from  a broader perspective, not only 
analyzing the financial crisis but digging m ore deeply into how we got to the present 
scenario, exploring its economic policy implications and finding the lessons to be learned 
from it. For a short pr esentation this could be to o ambitious, so I will ha ve to leave out 
some parts of the story. I will concentra te in some issues that I believe are essen tial for 
understanding the present state of affairs:  global im balances, the financial crisis, 
emerging econom ies’ growth and globalizati on, with its inflati onary effects and 
“decoupling” phenomenon. I will continue with some policy lessons and implications on 
the Chilean economy. 
 
But first allow me to make some reflections on economic policy.  
 
Entrepreneurial success and failure are inherent to market economies. This is also true in 
financial entities. W e know that in the  corporate world rotation is high, with firm s 
coming in and going out, and jobs being created  and destroyed. This is at the cornerstone 
of Schumpeter’s  destructive creation, and explains a substant ial part of progress and 
productivity growth. However, there are ne gative externalities.  Miscoordination and 
contagion problems, especially in the financ ial system, have the potential to amplify the 
cycles and transform destructive creation into destructive destruction.  
 
A financial institution in distress does not  make the h eadlines, but wh en complications 
become systemic, the consequences can be very  disturbing. It is thus crucial to prevent 
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problems in one specific sector from  spreading across the whole econ omy, with costly  
consequences. Hence the importance of safeguarding the economy’s financial stability.  
 
Until a while ago, when I was a sked to speak about financial stab ility I normally  
discussed evidence from developing econom ies. W e have learned than exchange-rate 
crises are costly per se, but if accompanied by a financial b reakdown the cost duplicates. 
Similarly, an econom ic slowdown cum  banking cr isis has severe e ffects on output and 
employment. But today we need not resort  to those stories. The US has  been 
accumulating a cu rrent-account deficit for quite  some time that sooner or later would 
have to be corrected via deceleration and depreciation. But the financial crises that got in 
the picture will make adjustments much more expensive.  
 
Global imbalances  
 
By the late 1990s, the US current account defi cit began to soar: From 140 billion dollars 
in 1997—equivalent to 1.7% of GDP— it clim bed to 739 billion dollars in 2007, that is, 
5.3% of GDP (figure 1).  
 
A first glance at the data requires screening the regional savings and investment balances 
to see how current-account deficits are dist ributed around the world. What we se e is a  
dramatic fall in savings—both private and public—in the United States,  but also a major 
increase in surpluse s in Asia. This ref lects increased savings in China,  but also a post-
crisis dramatic reduction in investment in the rest of Asia.
1 The recession of 2001 brought 
a slight relapse, but growth resumed briefly. Fiscal policy was of little help, although the 
fact that the international  interest rate was so low—as  opposed to the m id-1980s' twin 
deficits experience—is an indication that the cause of the deficit was not the drop in US 
saving , but rather Asia’s surplus. Later on, th is increase in Asia’s net saving combined 
with significant terms of trade gains (figure 2). T hus, there was a large amount of funds  
looking for a place to invest. The United States  had the capacity to  produce profitable 
securities to absorb said savings (Caballero et al., 2008).  
 
A different version of this story was that th e deficit was simply m is-measured, owing to 
its many non-observable components, which led  analysts to mistake foreign funding for  
foreign income (Haus mann & Sturzenegger, 2 006). This is the case, for exam ple, of 
seniorage.  
 
Both stories help explain why the current-acc ount deficit can persis t in high leve ls for 
longer than usual. But dom estic factors also  played a part in the U S. expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies while a real-e state bubble was building  up, put additional 
weight on the fall in savings.  
 
The main question was  if this p rocess could be sustained, and th e more benign visions 
thought it could last a long tim e. But the a ccumulation of i mbalances at least had to 
moderate, which indicated that the dollar w ould weaken and output would slow down.   
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Calculations performed a few years back in dicate that a dollar  depreciation of around 
40% was necessary to reduce the current-account deficit by 3 percentage points of GDP.
2 
According to estimates by Freund and Warnock (2007), such an adjustment would cause 
a GDP slowdown of around half a percentage point, much less than a financial crisis. 
 
On the other hand, and as has been made apparent by the financial crisis, the world lent to 
the US, to a large ex tent to finance overval ued houses th at were sold to fam ilies that 
could not afford the m. Now we s ee confir mation that such an expansion was not a 
healthy one.   
 
Real-estate boom and financial crisis 
 
For several years, housing prices spiraled up in a number of developed economies (figure 
3). There w ere lengthy debates whether a bubbl e was form ing, that is, if prices were 
beyond what could be warranted by fundamentals (housing services provided by homes). 
For exam ple, the  World Economic Outlook of Septe mber 2004 (T errones, 2004), 
analyzed what could happen if interest rates increased. This  was three years before the 
collapse, which occurred within the context of a mild increase in US interest rates. First 
were subprim e mortgages and banking losses , then the monoliners and Bear S terns 
followed suit, as did mortgage credit providers (Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae), insurance 
companies, other investm ent banks, and so  on. A proble m that began with subprim e 
mortgage loan delinquency has spread to the whole real-estate market (figure 4). 
 
In analyzing the problem of housing prices, the first thing we should recognize is that in a 
first approach, housing price fluctuations shou ld not result in signifi cant fluctuations in 
consumption. A rise in the price of the hom e increases the household’s asset value, but 
also increases the cost of living in it, so th e net result should not be  any material change 
in consumptions of goods different from housing.
3 Therefore, a first effect of a real-estate 
crisis should be a drop in the constructi on sector, not a drastic  fall in consum ption. 
Nevertheless, there are a num ber of factors that help explain  the increased sensitivity of 
consumption and output to housing prices, an d top of the list is transm ission via the 
financial system. When the higher value of the homes is not capitalized by the owners but 
is mortgaged in a fast, fragile credit expans ion, the ensuing contraction can be extrem ely 
severe, as we can see now.    
 
Despite the severity of the pres ent crisis, so far its effects ha ve been reined in by strong 
policy decisions oriented at warding off a financial implosion.  
   
The imm ediate policy reaction when the cris is was unleashed was the provis ion of 
liquidity and an aggressive cut to the fed f unds interest rate in the US (f igure 5). New 
credit facilities were designe d and huge am ounts of liquidity  were injected, but tensions  
in monetary markets persist. (figure 6). Even if liquidity abounds, it does not move from 
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those who have it in excess to tho se in demand, because of the gr eat uncertainty that 
exists and the decis ion of fi nancial entities to hold on to  their liqu idity surp luses to 
cushion themselves against balance-sheet sho cks (Allen and Carletti, 2008) or sim ply to 
benefit from buying assets at discount prices.  
 
The financial crisis is the outcom e of two  key phenomena. On one side is a period of 
stability, low interest rates, abundant liquidi ty, fast economic growth and an asset price 
bubble (figure 7). This com bination of aggregate factors gives way, as often occurs, to a 
phase of fast credit expansion. Actually, a financial crisis is much more likely to owe to a 
credit expansion, but not every  credit boom ends up in a crisis
4. At the same time, many 
countries have recorded a real-estate boom, but not all of them have found themselves in 
the extreme financial system breakdown as the United States. The problem is that this has 
occurred within a spiral of financial innovation in very poorly regulated market segments. 
One important task will be to figure out why the financial systems of different economies 
with sim ilar credit growth rates and housin g price behaviors have  had so different 
outcomes. 
 
The low in terest rates  prom pted a search  for bett er returns.  Individuals with zero 
repayment capacity were prov ided loans, an d to redu ce the r isk, said lo ans were 
securitized and often taken out  of the banks'  balance sheets  (i.e. structured investm ent 
vehicles and conduits), so no further capital  requirements were necessary for the banks. 
Credits were issued on the ba sis of ever-increasing housing  prices, so the m ortgage was 
backing enough to relax the lending standards.  As often oc curs when the storm hits, the 
situation reversed and a credit co ntraction followed (figure 8). Also, the real-estate  
bubble created a demand for homes as financial assets. 
 
These loans were sold to agents th at neglected the risk ev aluation process, hence the 
contamination to the whole financial syst em. The "originate and distribute" m odel 
crashed, risk-rating institutions were unable to properly rate complex securities, while the 
executive compensation structure also encouraged the search for returns. 
 
Lending to risky borrowers that fail to repay is certainly costly, but it can hardly unleash 
a crisis of the magnitude we are seeing today. The problem is aggravated by the way the 
banks got rid of these loans, how they were  rated, the derivatives that were cr eated to 
reduce the risk and pretend they had been  transferred away. There are also doubts  
whether the derivatives markets' operation was as transparent as it should have been or if 
it was m anipulated. The paradox of the presen t scenario is that the banking system, 
whose objectives should be to interm ediate credits and hedge against risks, seem ingly 
concealed the risks in a complex web of derivatives (and notes) thanks to regulations that 
didn't measure up to the challenge. 
 
Another aggravating circumstance is the transition of the bank-based financial system to 
a system based on tradable, short-run-debt ce rtificates. This scheme opens the door to a 
bank run that differs from  the old ones where custom ers stood in line to withdraw their 
deposits. The recent incorporation of safety-net policies for institutions (Prim ary Dealer 
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Lending and bankarization of investm ent banks) and securities (guarantees to Money 
Market Mutual Funds), are the offspring of  this change in the financial system . The 
lessons learned in the 1920s,  which led to the creation of  the Fed is being "relearned" 
now. It is w orth recalling that before the Fe d came to life, the United States endured a 
major banking system crisis every three years (Gorton, 1988). 
 
World inflation and growth 
 
China’s sustained grow th for m any years alre ady has been at the core of the world 
economy’s evolution. The Chinese incorporatio n to the global world was great news, 
because it brought with it economic growth and low prices. The continuous migration of 
millions of people from the coun tryside to the city boosted world output. They not only  
could produce at lower prices bu t they also were the caus e of the increase in sav ings in 
that country. 
 
China is maybe the most em blematic exam ple, but growth has been  present in  the 
majority of emerging economies, in particular in Asia and Latin America.  
 
One of the reasons why in the ten years be fore 2006 inflation was low, especially in 
developed econom ies, was the supply of goods from  e merging m arkets.
5 Inf lation is  
dependent on the m onetary policy decisions  and in the extrem e, under total inflation 
control, it could be pegged to the target regardless of the import prices of imports or other 
factors. However, what globalizatio n permitted was a perio d of low inflation and h igh 
growth (table 1). There was a chang e in relative prices, with a significant drop in pr ices 
of goods from emerging economies going global and, as we see today, with an increase in 
the relative prices of foodstuff and energy. 
 
It can be said, then, that globalization was a productivity shock that allowed for transitory 
reductions in inflation. However, the phenom enon could not last forever, and is now 
reversing. 
 
The accelerated growth  of the  past several years finally sh owed on prices. This can be 
interpreted as we would analyze inflation in just any country. When potential GDP grows 
fast, inflation rem ains constant or m ay even fall. However,  if actual GDP growth runs 
above its potential or trend, price pressure s result. The world economy grew fa st, and 
although China contributed to world potential ou tput growth, inflationary pressures have 
emerged in those sectors where the demand grew faster than supply, namely oil and foods 
(figure 9). Inexpensiv e goods can still be p roduced, if capacity expands without 
generating price pressures. But the dem and for oil, steel, minerals, etc., recorded strong 
increases, which pushed prices up. The suppl y has not responded to dem and with the 
same vigor. 
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A case worth highlighting is foods. Som e of them absorbed the dem and increase due to 
economic growth with supply increases, but  then a new source of de mand appeared: bio 
fuels, which have further strained the prices of grains. 
 
Another factor that, according to som e analysts, has been important in price hikes has 
been investor involvement, demanding commodities as another asset  in their portfolios. 
But if investors were buying to  resell with a margin, this would translate into an increase 
in inventories, which it has not. 
 
Accordingly, the purchases of futures by som e agents go hand in hand with the sale of 
futures by others, and are norm ally the counterpart of hedging operations. On the other 
hand, while investors’ positions have risen substantially in the commodities markets, they 
still share but a sm all fraction of the market. Overall, one cannot rule out that investors’ 
buy and sell strategies will have an effect on the high short-run volatility of prices, but it 
is difficult to blame on them the high and persistent levels we see today. 
  
The worst nightmare in terms of high inflation and  low output has been the price of  oil, 
which has broken all the records. After st anding at US$12 per barrel in 1999 as a 
consequence of the Asian crisis, it starte d climbing throughout the 2000s in tandem with 
world growth. By m id-2006, when the oil pr ice was approaching  US$70 per barrel, the 
question was why the world econom y was so  insensitive to it. Res earchers tried to 
explain why such a heavy price increase had  been so m ild on inf lation and output (De  
Gregorio et al., 2007; Blanchar d and Galí, 2007). Fingers point ed at the usual suspects : 
good monetary policies and less intensive use of oil around the world. 
 
In sum, the world economy was more insensitive to the oil price. However, if oil demand 
continued to rise without a  corresponding increase in suppl y, a large enough price rise  
was necessary to begin having an effect on  the demand. The levels of a couple of years 
ago were no t enough to restrain the dem and, and precisely because of that, researchers 
found little effects from the shock on output a nd inflation. Only when the price went  
beyond US$100 per barrel did it truly begin to  affect the demand, and from then on the 
reduced output prospects have continued to determine its price.  
 
Inflation-wise, the in ternational sc enario  is still de licate. Af ter a shock of  oil and  
foodstuff prices that had no parallel since th e Great Inflation of the 1970s, inflation has 
risen every where (figu re 10). Als o, inflati on expecta tions have increased acco rdingly 
(figures 11 and 12). In general term s, it has  not yet becom e a generalized inflationary 
phenomenon but, inasmuch as it is transm itted to expectations and wages, it can be very 
persistent.  
 
Monetary policy reactions  to this phenom enon have b een varied. In developed 
economies, where growth prospects are frail, interest rates have been lowered (figure 13). 
In general, the slowdown is expected to be sufficient to bring down high inflation. On the 
contrary, in developing econom ies m onetary policy has been on average restrictive. 
Growth rates are still reasonable, so one cannot rely on a drop in inflation without having 
to raise the interest rate.  7
 
World growth is still s trong. (figure 14). W hat is new is the decoupling of developed 
economies with the rest of the world. Not surp risingly, the entire  world is decelerating, 
but the degree of expansion of output varies si gnificantly. Never in the last half century 
did we see a period of such decoupling. The  phenomenon is not exclusive to China, and 
has been present for several years already.  The main doubts are how long will it last—
which depends on the true decoup ling capacity that emerging economies will display—
and how long will dev eloped econ omies’ gro wth hold. Here, accu mulating a curren t 
account surplus can help. For example, the  high levels of reserves in China allow 
financing deficit for several years and thus  weather the turbulences with domestic 
growth. Still, one cannot rule out a prolonge d period of weak activity in developed 
countries that ends up seriously deteriorating growth in emerging economies, particularly 
those specializing in goods demanded in the former. 
 
Globalization, where countries sell their products in global markets rather than in specific 
economies, certainly supports the afore mentioned decoupling, but  it also spreads the  
effects of financial shocks around the world. We have seen international stock exchanges 
plummeting, and risk premiums of emerging economies rising (figures 15 and 16). Also, 
large foreign exchange fluctuations have oc curred, but this is good news, because the 
exchange rates are helping the adjus tment (figure 17). Asset prices show no decoupling 
but, as we well know, price corr ections may limit the adjustments in quantities. The key 
to this is whether price corrections are helping to avoid fluctuations in output or are being 
conveyors of the problems.  
 
The good performance of emerging economies should not lead to unfounded optimism or 
vanity, because this is largely the result of sound macroeconomic policies, and in such we 




I will finish with four points. First I will review the harmful effects that the ongoing crisis 
will have o n the f uture development of financial markets. Next I will discuss f inancial 
bubbles and boom s in monetary policym aking, and the nature of the present crisis and 
possible consequences, to wrap up with the im plications of the world growth scenario on 
the Chilean monetary policy. 
 
In the present turmoil, authorities have acted as lenders of last reso rt providing liquidity 
to ensure proper market functioning. Nonetheless, regarding financial bailouts two costs 
have to be balanced: averting a financial co llapse with catastrophic consequences on the 
one hand, and the negative signals that com e from said bailouts, on the other. Not only 
have the too-big-to-fail inst itutions been rescued, but also  entities whose connections 
with the system are such that if they fail the whole financial system may be shaken.  
 
Troubled companies’ shareholders should not  be bailed out, because it is im portant that 
risk evaluation is done more dilig ently in th e future. Care m ust be taken in res cuing 
debtors of defaulted firms, because it may relax borrowing and repayment discipline, and  8
punish good creditors by com parison. The tr adeoff between these two objectives is 
clearly illus trated with the dev elopments of  the past week. Allowing the dem ise of 
Lehman  Brothers was a sign that bailouts  would not be up for grabs and even the 
downfall of a large investment bank would be accepted, but this may have accelerated the 
devastating chain of  events that f ollowed.  Indeed, w hat is wor risome is that th e 
dimensions of the crisis that follow th e Lehman collapse were no anticipated by the 
authorities.  W ith the benef its of hindsight, it would have been better to avoid the 
collapse, and its effects should have been foreseen by policymakers.  
 
The consequences of  the f inancial crisis will spread pas t the f inancial system , as is 
already perceived in recent discussions on pr ivatization of earnings and socialization of 
losses. Hopefully this debate will soon fo cus on the important issues, but we must 
recognize that the excessive aggressivene ss and a mbition of some  players in  the 
international financial markets, the irresponsible behavior of  operators unaware of what 
they were trading, and lax risk asses sment and regulation, will penalize the innocent and 
the guilty alike.  
 
A sound, com petitive financial sy stem is essential for econom ic developm ent. The 
incentive structure is key for its smooth opera tion. If no credit exists, only those owning 
the resources could invest or buy durables.  The financial markets allow the anticipation 
of consumption and invest. But its stability must be safeguarded to ensure efficient credit 
allocation and proper risk management.  
 
One issue that has been discussed  in m onetary policy theory and practice is how to 
handle bubbles. The conventional view is that  nothing can be done to prevent them ; that 
they cannot be detected, that they must be a cause for concern only to the extent that they 
affect inflation, and that the only thing to do is to clean the mess after they burst.  
 
This crisis, however, shows that this view is pa infully wrong. In fact, a  financial bubble 
and even a credit boom, can have little or no e ffect on inflation, but that is not the point. 
Furthermore, an interest rate increase is  probably unable to bur st the bubble. But an 
excessive expansion of credit in the context  of financial euphoria jeopardizes the other 
objective of central banks: financial stability.  
 
One important lesson from the present crisis is that we cannot wait for the bubble to burst 
to correct its effects. This m ay have work ed with th e technological bubble of the early 
2000s, but the real-estate boom  is proof that th e problem can be worse. The way to deal 
with financial and price instability is different. For the first, the focus is on risk regulation 
and evaluation by the authorities. Detected  vulnerabilities m ust be  flagged and, if 
necessary, new regulations must be adopted. For price stability, there is monetary policy.  
 
It m ay well be the case th at p rice stabil ity and financial stab ility have different 
implications on interest rate m anagement. The best exam ple of th is is the aggressive 
reduction of interest rates adopted by the Fed th is year. Interest rate cuts were necessary 
to alleviate liquidity tensions in m onetary markets and ensure the sound operation of the  9
payments system . Failing to take these act ions m ight have further exacerb ated the 
financial crisis.  
 
However, conflicts of this kind  are faced in  extreme situations and this m ust be clear  
when making monetary policy decisions. Three decisions of the Central Bank of Chile to 
intervene the foreign exchange market during this decade can be inte rpreted as decisions 
under extreme circumstances. They were associated to severe stress in foreign exchange  
markets or to the need to strengthen the international liquidity position. To avoid conflicts 
with price stability, the in tervention that was begun in  April has been im plemented 
mechanically and transparently in order to orient monetary policy in consistency with the 
required convergence of inflation to the target.  
 
It is hard to find a financial  crisis as severe as this one  since the Great Depression. Still, 
its real con sequences are still m uch milder than those of other episodes, including of 
course the Great Depression and even the Gr eat Inflation of the  1970s. We have learned 
two lesson s from  these occurrences and wh ich are clearly presen t in the  acts and 
statements from  central bankers around the w orld. One is that central banks are the 
lenders of last resort and must supply the necessary liquidity so that financial markets can 
operate, even in critical tim es. The othe r is that inflation  must be fought with 
determination and letting it settle down and stay in the econom y is very costly. Different 
perceptions and ass essments can alter th e sh ort-term course of  monetary policy, so 
flexibility a nd realism  are nec essary to tim ely correct th e route,  an d this h as been 
happening around the world and in Chile in particular. But not only have we learned from 
past errors, like the need to have good economic  policies; the world  is also better. The  
progress of the p ast few decades in technol ogy, flexibility, in ternational in tegration, 
transparency and accoun tability, among other fact ors, make this world a safer place.  In 
Chile we have a policy fra mework that grants us a good position like n o other before, to 
sail through troubled waters.  
 
Regarding the world econom y, there are big  risks. The Chilean inflationary prob lem 
stems from international price  rises, although recently we ha ve seen the harmful effe cts 
of propagation. In the baseline scenario, th e world will post strong growth in com ing 
years, driven to a large extent by em erging economies, particularly China and India. One 
cannot rule out a deeper and  longer lasting slowdown of i ndustrialized countries than 
assumed in the baseline projection. In a w eaker economic scenario, commodity prices 
should decline. A drop in the oil price woul d come as a relief fo r the world economy. 
Also, a weaker world econom y could affect Ch ile’s GDP growth directly. These forces 
would pull down inflation. However, the infl ationary dynamics and the convergence of 
inflation to the target cannot be based on a weak world scenario. This is a possibility and, 
as we always do, we will act with sufficien t flexibility and realism  to in corporate 
international developm ents and prospects in  the analysis that  underlies our m onetary 
policy decisions. In these m oments, infl ation risks and dynam ics do not allow for  
excessive optimism.   10
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Figure 1 
Current Account by regions 
(% of world GDP) 
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Global imbalances, current account balances 
(Billions of dollars) 
 
(f) Forecast.
Source: International Monetary Fund.
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(IT01=100, index) 
 
(*) Nominal index deflated by CP1. (1) OFHEO. (2) S&P/Case-Shiller. (3) Nationwide.
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Real interest rates 
(percentage) 
 
(1) 10 year nominal bond return, minus same period expected inflation. (2) Short term nominal interest 
rate minus CD.
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Banking credit approval standards (*) 
 
Corporate credits 
(big and medium) Consumption credits
(*) Positive value is more flexibility in credit approval. 
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Annual inflation (*) 
(percentage) 
 
(*) Geometric average of countries each region. 
(1) Latin America: Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia y Peru.
(2) Asia EM: China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.
(3) Europe EM: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia andTurkey.
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Inflation forecast for 2008 (*) 
(percentage) 
 





























(*) Geometric average of inflation forecast.  For Latin America and Russia, end of the year inflation data. 
Source: Consensus Forecasts.
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(1) Average of reference rates for: Brazil, Colombia, Korea, Chile, China, Hungary, India, Israel, Mexico, Peru, 
Poland, Czech Republic, South Africa and Turkey.
(2) Average of reference rates for: Canada, US, Japan, Norway, UK, Switzerland, Sweden, Euro area. 
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Table 1  
World growth (*) 
(annual growth, percentage) 
 
Prom. Prom. 
1990-99 2000-05 2006 2007 (e)  May.  Sep. May.  Sep. 2010 (f)
World 2,9 3,8 5,1 5,0 3,8 S 4,0 3,8 T 3,7 4,4
World at market ER 2,4 2,9 3,9 3,8 2,6 S 2,8 2,6 T 2,5 3,4
US 3,1 2,5 2,9 2,0 0,7 S 1,6 0,8 S 1,0 2,8
Euro area 2,2 1,9 2,8 2,6 1,4 T 1,2 1,2 T 0,4 1,9
Japan 1,5 1,6 2,4 2,1 1,4 T 0,8 1,5 T 0,8 2,0
China 10,0 9,4 11,6 11,9 9,3 S 9,9 9,5 T 9,0 8,9
Rest of Asia 5,5 4,8 5,5 5,8 4,7 T 4,6 5,0 = 5,0 5,2
Latin America 2,7 2,9 5,4 5,6 4,3 = 4,3 3,5 S 3,8 4,2
Commodity exporters 2,7 3,1 2,7 3,3 2,0 T 1,6 2,4 T 2,2 2,9
Trade partners 3,0 3,1 4,6 4,8 3,4 S 3,5 3,3 T 3,1 3,8
2008 (f) 2009 (f)
(*) Regional growth are weighted average by world GPP participation in IMF WEO (April 2008) 
(e) Estimated; (f) Forecasted. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile base on investment bank data, Consensus Forecast and IMF.
 